This paper reports the results of an experiment on the revealed preference for skewness in a comparison of continuous return distributions. We find that revealed preferences are highly sensitive to the way asset risks are communicated. While probability density functions lead to a pronounced preference for left-skewed distributions, the opposite is true for cumulative distribution functions. Systematic misperceptions of the variance cannot explain the sensitivity of preferences to the presentation format. Part of the preference for positive skewness when risks are communicated through probability density functions is due to a systematic misestimation of the expected return. We also find that self-reported risk aversion, a measure of risk attitude commonly used in practice, is a valuable predictor of skewness preferences. Individuals that judge themselves as more risk-averse show a stronger preference for right-skewness.
I. Introduction
Most normative and behavioral models of decision making under uncertainty predict under reasonable assumptions that decision makers should prefer right-skewed over symmetric or leftskewed probability distributions. 1 The intuitive prediction of a preference for right-skewed distributions finds support from behavioral evidence in decision making under uncertainty.
Compared to a symmetric distribution, there is typically less probability mass in the low outcome domain, making right-skewed distributions more attractive to a loss-averse decision maker (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) if these low outcomes correspond to losses. In addition, rightskewed distributions reduce the probability of falling below a specific security level and increase the likelihood of receiving a very high (aspirational) outcome. This departure from symmetry increases the desirability of a right-skewed distribution from the viewpoint of securitypotential/aspiration (SP/A) theory (Lopes 1984 (Lopes , 1987 . Arrow (1965) and Arditti (1967) show that under the expected utility paradigm the necessary condition for right-skewness preference is non-increasing absolute risk aversion. The same prediction for individual investors is obtained by different behavioral models incorporating optimism (Brunnermeier et al. 2007 ), loss aversion (Berkelaar et al. 2004) or non-linear probability weighting (Barberis and Huang 2008) . We investigate whether this conjecture finds unrestricted empirical support and show that both the presentation format of a return distribution and a subject's self-reported risk aversion interact with revealed skewness preferences.
A preference for right-skewness has the potential to explain a variety of decision-making puzzles.
Studying the decisions of horse race bettors, Golec and Tamarkin (1998) illustrate that decision makers are attracted by the skewness of bet returns. This can explain why horse race bettors accept risky gambles with negative expected values. A preference for right-skewness also has important implications in the field of financial decision making. Kapadia (2006) , for example, attributes the long-run underperformance of IPOs largely to investors' preference for skewed returns. In a recent paper Mitton and Vorkink (2007) argue that the existence of underdiversified investors (see, e.g., Calvet et al. 2007) can be explained by extending Markowitz's (1952) classic 1 We use the terms right-skewness and positive skewness as well as left-skewness and negative skewness interchangeably throughout the paper.
mean-variance framework to the third moment of returns. Specifically, they propose an asset pricing model that allows for heterogeneity of skewness preferences. They find that those investors who have a high preference for right-skewness sacrifice mean-variance efficiency to obtain rightskewed probability distributions. These are mean-variance-skewness efficient but offer lower expected returns than mean-variance efficient portfolios. 2 Mitton and Vorkink (2007) find empirical support for their predictions based on data from an online broker. This insight may be of particular interest to financial advisors. If some investors prefer right-skewed portfolio returns, then it is unadvisable from a prescriptive point of view to recommend mean-variance optimized portfolios that eliminate exactly the skewness these investors prefer. It is therefore important to better understand under what circumstances strong skewness preferences are observed.
Taking a broader decision support perspective an information system needs to meet at least two requirements to help the long-term investor: first, it has to facilitate the selection of non-normal return distributions to accommodate a large variety of preferences, and second, it has to offer a graphical visualization of the assets' return distributions to enhance comprehensibility. With skewness as the most distinctive feature of non-normal distributions, one should be interested in whether these two features interact. This paper aims at providing experimental evidence to shed light on these peculiarities of skewness preferences. Experimental methods, which allow for the examination of tailor-made variations, provide a desirable complement to existing empirical research based on field data.
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Experimental studies that focus explicitly on skewness preferences are relatively rare. 4 Brünner et al. (2007) study simple two-state lotteries that can be ordered with respect to third-order stochastic dominance. They find that, indeed, a majority of subjects have a preference for rightskewness. However, the authors consider no continuous distributions, which are important for 2 Note that Barberis and Huang's (2008) behavioral asset pricing model makes a similar prediction, but their result is based on homogenous agents.
Examples of field data studies include Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Boyer et al. (2008) . The first paper shows that co-skewness with the market portfolio is priced in security markets, while the second paper shows that this is also true for idiosyncratic skewness. 4 In some sense, any experimental study on loss aversion, risk preferences or risk perception that considers nonsymmetric distributions is implicitly investigating skewness. However, skewness is often introduced only to manipulate risk perception (see, e.g., Butler et al. 2005) or is considered as a robustness check with respect to another research question (see, e.g., Unser 2000 or Lopes 1984 . None of these studies explore skewness in a comprehensive and systematic way. Further, in some cases the papers don't contain descriptive statistics with respect to skewness preferences, although the experimental setup would have allowed for such an analysis. investment decisions. Interestingly, Shafir et al. (2003) find that positive skewness helps to explain the observed risk behavior of lower animals. In a study on risk perception, Summers and Duxbury (2006) manipulate variance and skewness of an asset to shift the mode of a probability distribution function. Subjects were shown the density functions of continuous random variables with identical means. Surprisingly, Summers and Duxbury (2006) find that the left-skewed distributions are judged least risky on a ten-point ordinal scale. Knowing that risk perception affects choice (see, e.g., Weber and Milliman 1997) , this result suggests that decision makers have a preference for leftskewed gambles, in contrast to the results of Brünner et al. (2007) and the field evidence cited above.
In our experiment subjects were confronted with three different return distributions of equal
variance. An investment in an equity index (like the S&P 500) with a nearly symmetric return distribution serves as our reference. One alternative is a right-skewed distribution depicting a portfolio insurance strategy, the other a left-skewed distribution that represents a covered call strategy as implemented in many discount certificates. These (right-and left-)skewed distributions are generated and calibrated by constructing portfolios out of the equity index, a riskless asset and call options on the equity index. 5 As a first step, the portfolio weights of the risky assets (equity index and call options) were carefully chosen to create the characteristic profiles of the two financial instruments while retaining smooth and visually appealing right-/left-skewed probability distribution functions. As a second step, these risky portfolios were balanced with the risk-free asset to match the variance of the equity index. 6 This approach preserves no additional degrees of freedom to control for differences in moments other than variance, a sacrifice to the realistic investment context we are interested in. It is important to emphasize that this study does not aim at rigorously eliciting the skewness preferences in a population. Such a task would require ceterisparibus variations in skewness holding other important features of a distribution, like the probability of a loss or kurtosis, constant. Our study aims instead at analyzing the role of presentation format for return distributions of practical relevance. These distributions change on many dimensions when the skewness is changed. We use a bond plus call option(s) strategy to implement portfolio insurance.
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Appendix A contains more information about the construction of the right-/left-skewed portfolios. 7 E.g., for unimodal return distributions, like ours, a decrease in skewness (moving towards left-skewness) usually goes along with a rightward shift of the peak (mode). And even though it could be interesting to disentangle effects of skew and distribution mode by just moving probability mass in the (right and left) tails, this has little practical Our paper contributes to the literature in four ways. First, we add to the few experimental studies on revealed skewness preferences by examining them in a realistic investment context, rather than in an arbitrary lottery scenario. On aggregate, an insignificant preference for right-skewness is observed in our data. Second, we propose an explanation for the mixed results in existing experimental studies. Motivated by the research of Unser (2000), Weber et al. (2005) and Diacon and Hasseldine (2007) , 8 who show that risk perception is influenced by the way asset return information is presented, we examine the interaction of skewness preferences and presentation format. We add to their work by looking at return distributions that are not normally distributed (not even approximately) and by analyzing a larger variety of presentation formats. Furthermore, we focus on a wealth distribution at the end of an investment horizon and not on the presentation of past returns. Such an approach is relevant for many applications such as retirement savings decisions. Additionally, we focus on the revealed preference for higher moments in contrast to previous research on presentation formats. It turns out that communicating asset risks via density functions, the approach chosen by Summers and Duxbury (2006) , is the only presentation format that leads to a significant preference for left-skewed gambles. We also identify presentation formats that generate a strong preference for right-skewed gambles (cumulative distribution functions). The conflicting results in the extant literature are therefore likely to be caused by the presentation format used. As a third contribution, we show that self-reported risk aversion, a measure commonly used by practitioners to elicit risk preferences, is a proxy for revealed skewness preferences. Decision makers who judge themselves as highly risk-averse are more likely to choose a right-skewed gamble. Fourth, we investigate two possible reasons for the sensitivity of preferences to the presentation format. There are no systematic differences in a variance estimation task over different presentation formats. However, expected returns are overestimated for left-skewed distributions and underestimated for right-skewed distributions when risks are communicated via a probability density function. These misperceptions, which are related to the relevance. In practice, a distribution with another skew is seldom characterized only by differences of probability mass in the tails.
8 Weber et al. (2005) find that the presentation format of historical asset returns influences expected asset volatility, whereas investors' perception of the assets' risk and return is strongly driven by the familiarity of asset names and only slightly by the choice of presentation format. Diacon and Hasseldine (2007) , on the other hand, present evidence for a significant effect of presentation format on subjects' perceptions of risk and return. The divergence in their findings may be due to differences in the presentation formats under study. Compared to Diacon and Hasseldine (2007) , we choose a different framework in our analysis as we model distributions of terminal values and no price paths (as generated by actual market data). These settings are not directly comparable.
peak of the distributions, can partly explain the preference for negatively skewed distributions under the probability density function presentation format. We show that this misperception of expected returns is strong enough that we can design pairs of return distributions for which a significant portion of subjects prefers the stochastically dominated alternative.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly explains the procedures of our classroom experiment and summarizes the main experiment's results. This section also highlights the importance of the presentation format and illustrates that self-reported risk aversion, a risk measure commonly used in practice, is a valuable predictor of skewness preferences. Sections III to V examine the observed effects in three shorter follow-up experiments in more depth. Section VI concludes with a discussion of practical implications.
II. Experiment I

II.A. Design
We seek to analyze the effects of changes in the graphical representation of asset risks on revealed skewness preferences. 9 Our starting point for selecting presentation formats is the work of Ibrekk and Morgan (1987) , who recommend the use of probability distribution functions (PDF) and cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for risk communication. We do not explicitly mark the location of the mean to avoid influencing subjects by highlighting a specific moment, the expected value (see Ibrekk and Morgan) .
To be able to analyze whether slight modifications in presentation format influence skewness preferences, we include a rotated cumulative distribution function (RCDF) in our study. A RCDF is derived from a CDF by switching vertical and horizontal axes. As a further modification, our RCDF uses "probability of exceeding" instead of "cumulative probability" as the x-axis label and specifies the distribution of outcomes in final wealth rather than percentage returns on its y-axis. Both 9
More precisely, one should speak of preferences for moments higher than variance instead of preferences for skewness. As explained before, we are interested in revealed preferences for realistic distributions for which a variation of skewness goes along with a change of other higher moments like kurtosis. However, we continue to use the word "skewness" in a practical sense referring to the higher moments of a distribution, because skewness is the most salient feature.
modifications are intended to enhance the comprehensibility of this explorative presentation format, which (in contrast to PDF and CDF) our subjects were unfamiliar with prior to the experiment.
Bar charts that provide ten discrete return observations are the next type of presentation format in our experiment. Such presentation formats are commonly used in mutual fund prospectuses or by financial advisors. Again, we differentiate two variants with almost identical informational content:
the randomized bar chart (RBC) and 10-state-chart (10S). Both presentation formats display 10 discrete observations of the continuous return distribution as presented in the PDF and CDF. In order to construct the RBC and 10S we calculate the conditional means for all deciles of a return distribution, i.e., we compute average returns for each decile. By extending the concept of expected shortfall to the whole range of outcomes, this bracket mean method offers a sensible discretization of a given continuous return distribution and restricts the unavoidable loss of information to a minimum. Mimicking patterns of historical returns, the RBC displays these ten conditional means as bars of random order, whereas the 10S presents the conditional means in ascending order from state 1 (lowest return) to 10 (highest return).
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Finally, we include in our analysis a quantiles graphic (QTS), which is a novel practitioner's approach that provides a nice complement to the other presentation formats. The QTS shows the monthly development of the median and the 5%/95% quantiles of an investment strategy, and hence requires additional calculations. The return distribution and quantile values for investment horizons of less than one year (months 1 to 11) are computed using the same logic as in the 12-month base case. 11 The final QTS graph integrates the quantile-based information for months 1 to 12 via three smoothed lines for each of the two investments (A and B). Nonetheless, for the decision situation under study, subjects are left with only three usable data points, since the fixed investment horizon of 12 months renders this additional sub-annual information irrelevant. 10 The 10S explicitly presents the average return of all distributions as horizontal lines and hence serves as a control treatment. The 10S presentation format is therefore different from the others and stands in contrast to our effort to avoid the accentuation of specific return moments. 11 Refer to Appendix A for detailed information on the calculation of the sub-annual quantiles.
A short explanatory sentence that characterizes the information given in a particular diagram accompanies all presentation formats.
12 Figure 1 provides an illustration of all presentation formats used in our study. The paper-and-pencil experiment was carried out in class during a lecture on behavioral finance that is part of the master program at the Finance Center of the University of Münster. 13 Three sessions were conducted. Sessions 1 and 2 analyzed three different presentation formats each. The third session served as a consistency check. In the first two sessions, we asked subjects which presentation format they found most useful. We then reran the analysis in session 3 with PDF, CDF and 10S, the presentation formats that were ranked highest in decision usefulness in sessions 1 and 2. The number of questionnaires returned in sessions 1-3 was 129, 127 and 113, respectively. The questionnaire consisted of three parts: cover page, three separate pages with investment decisions 1-3 and a final page that will be explained later. Students were given approximately five minutes to complete the questionnaire. The general procedure was announced before the questionnaires were distributed to the students.
The cover page of the questionnaire laid out the hypothetical decision situation in front of the students:
"You would like to invest 10.000 Euro for one year. In the following we will ask you three times which of two alternative investments (A or B) you prefer for this purpose. Note: these three investment decisions do not only differ in their presentation format, the respective investments (A and B) are also different."
In the main part of the questionnaire, the students were always confronted with the same three investment decisions: Index vs. right-skewed, left-skewed vs. Index and right-skewed vs. leftskewed. The questionnaires differed in the way these three choices were matched with the various graphical return representations and with respect to the ordering of the three choices. In the first session the probability distribution function (PDF), rotated cumulative distribution function (RCDF) and randomized bar chart (RBC) were tested. The second session tested the presentation formats cumulative distribution function (CDF), 10-state-chart (10S) and quantiles (QTS). There was a oneweek time lag between these sessions. One could view this design as a mixed within and between design. In each session all subjects made the three investment decisions under three different presentation formats. E.g.: Index vs. right-skewed with PDFs, left-skewed vs. Index with RCDFs and 13 Questions of skewness preference were not discussed in this class.
right-skewed vs. left-skewed with RBCs. We therefore have a within design with respect to choices and a between design with respect to presentation formats.
To control for order effects the questionnaires were completely counterbalanced. Three drawings without replacement lead to six possible sequences in presentation formats. Each of these six sequences in presentation formats was matched with the three investment decisions in the same fashion. Overall this procedure resulted in 36 (6*6) variations of questionnaires per session. In the third session the fixed standard deviation of σ=0.2233 was varied to σ=0.05 and σ=0.40 as an additional robustness check. The standard deviation manipulation was between-subject in the sense that every participant responded only to distributions of equal variance. At the end of the questionnaire students had to provide their student ID (for matching purposes) and answer two additional questions. The first question asked them to rank the three presentation formats by decision usefulness. The second question was a self-assessment on risk aversion on a seven point scale (1=not risk averse at all; 7=extremely risk averse).
At the end of each class, one of the (returned) questionnaires was randomly selected, an investment decision was chosen and the corresponding student was remunerated to warrant incentive compatibility. To determine the exact payout amount, an initial investment of 100 Euro was multiplied by 1+ the randomly drawn return of the particular asset (Index, right-skewed or leftskewed) that was chosen by the student in the selected scenario. 14 This incentive was clearly communicated to the students in the general announcements that preceded each session.
II.B. Results
We first show how presentation format interacts with revealed skewness preferences and then address the question of whether self-reported risk aversion can serve as a predictor of revealed skewness preferences. The results of three different analyses will be presented. We start with descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests and then turn to a maximum likelihood estimation of a utility function. In our third test we conduct a probit analysis to illustrate interaction effects between self-reported risk aversion and skewness preferences.
The impact of presentation format.
Two presentation formats generate pronounced skewness preferences: Probability density functions (PDFs) seem to induce a preference for left-skewed gambles, whereas subjects largely opt for the right-skewed gamble when cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) are compared. Figure 2 summarizes subjects' choices grouped by presentation format.
Both effects are confirmed by the third session's results and thus can be considered robust. Ibrekk and Morgan's (1987) conjecture that the tendency to regard the peak of a PDF (mode) as the mean possibly explains why we observe a strong preference for left-skewed gambles when subjects evaluate PDFs.
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Figure 2: This figure shows descriptive statistics on all pairwise comparisons for sessions 1 and 2 (the two left panels) and for session 3 (the two right panels). In the upper half of this figure choices are pooled over all three investment decisions. The lower half reports results separated by the decision type. The percentage of subjects who choose the more right-skewed gamble is significantly different from 0.5 using a binominal test (p<0.01) for the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) in all sessions. The results for the other presentation formats are only marginally significant if they are significant at all.
For CDFs, Ibrekk and Morgan's (1987) conjecture that people mistakenly look at the median to estimate the mean does not seem to hold, as this should induce a preference for left-skewness, which is exactly the opposite of what we observe. Interestingly, by switching axes (CDF to RCDF), the preference for right-skewed returns largely disappears. Subjects' preferences seem to be highly specific to particular presentation formats and can be manipulated by slight modifications in design. For the 10-state-chart, the overall winner in reported decision usefulness, no clear preference pattern can be established. Subjects' preferences, if unbiased, are diverse. Table 2 summarizes subjects' judgments on the decision usefulness of the various presentation formats. The parameter estimation proceeds as follows. The utility values for the two distributions considered in one choice situation are denoted by 1 and 2 . The difference between these utilities is given by ΔU = 1 − 2 . ΔU is mapped via a standard cumulative normal distribution to a number between zero and one. For example, if 1 is substantially greater than 2 , then ΔU is relatively high and one would expect that distribution 1 is chosen with high probability ( (ΔU)).
The maximum likelihood procedure chooses the parameter in such a way that the probability that the observed choices are generated by a utility function , 3 with parameter is maximized.
16 Table 3 reports the results. 16 The statistics package Stata was used for the data analysis. In essence, our estimation program for the utility function is a straight-forward modification of the program given in Section A of Harrison (2007 Table 3 : Shown are the estimates of the preference parameter via maximum likelihood estimation. Standard errors are corrected for the fact that the same individual is responsible for more than one observation and therefore the errors of the responses from one subject are correlated (see, e. g., Wooldridge 2006) . N denotes the number of observations.
For the whole sample, we observe a positive although insignificant preference for right-skewness.
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The separate estimations for every presentation format confirm the results of the preceding analysis. Density functions result in a pronounced preference for left-skewed distributions, while the opposite is true for cumulative distribution functions. The coefficients are highly significant for these two presentation formats, while the estimated preference parameter is only marginally significant for most other presentation formats.
The impact of self-reported risk aversion.
To analyze the interaction of skewness preferences with self-reported risk aversion we calibrate a probit model. The dependent variable equals one if a subject chooses the more right-skewed distribution, that is, a preference for the index over the left-skewed distribution and a preference for the right-skewed distribution over the index or the left-skewed distribution. The dependent variable equals zero otherwise. The independent variables are dummy variables for the presentation formats, self-reported risk aversion, and additional terms to capture interactions between presentation formats and risk aversion (standard deviation).
One of the presentation formats has to be chosen as a reference category. In the probit model coefficients are then estimated relative to this benchmark. The 10-state-chart (10s) is chosen for all sessions. Strictly speaking, this choice is arbitrary. As a consequence, the coefficients are difficult to interpret because they show an effect relative to the reference category, and coefficients as well as significance levels will change for a different choice of reference category. We therefore choose another way of presenting results. Based on the estimated probit model, we predict the probability of choosing the more right-skewed gamble for different presentation formats and different degrees of self-reported risk aversion. Appendix B contains further details on the estimated probit models for the sake of completeness. Note that while the results of several models are reported in Appendix B, the predictions reported here always rely on the full models with all interaction effects (e.g., model C for sessions 1 and 2, and model 5 for session 3; see Appendix B).
The first two panels of Figure and skewness preferences, which can only be analyzed with the data from the third session. The relative height of the lines can be interpreted as the general tendency to choose the more rightskewed gamble. The self-assessment of subjects acts as a predictor of skewness preferences. An interaction effect between skewness preferences and self-reported risk aversion can be easily observed. For most presentation formats, we find that the higher the chosen score on the selfreported risk-aversion scale, the more likely subjects are to prefer a right-skewed distribution at the cost of some expected value. This interaction effect is especially pronounced for the 10-state-chart.
In contrast, the density function (PDF) shows virtually no interaction effect in any sessions. There is also evidence of an interaction between self-reported risk aversion and the choice of the more right-skewed distribution for the cumulative distribution presentation in session 2, but the effect is reversed: higher risk aversion is associated with more choices of the right-skewed distribution.
However, this result reverses in session 3. Based on the results for the other presentation formats it is likely that the reverse interaction effect in session 2 is just a statistical outlier. The results are in line with Shafir et al. (2003) , who show that skewness is a significant predictor of the risk behavior of lower animals. The standard deviation plays no significant role as shown in Figure 3d . Holding risk aversion at the sample mean, 18 it makes not much difference for skewness preferences if subjects choose between distributions with high, medium or low standard deviations. This result is robust with respect to all three presentation formats considered. Figures 3a and 3b show the interaction effect of skewness preferences and self-reported risk aversion separately for every presentation format. The same information is contained in Figure 3c for the third session holding standard deviation at the sample mean. Figure 3d shows the interaction between skewness preferences and standard deviation in the third session. Standard deviation (risk aversion) is held at its sample mean for Figure 3c (3d).
Next we repeat the parameter estimation exercise (for a skewness preference parameter) to illustrate the statistical significance of this effect. Using the sample mean of self-reported risk aversion (4.25) to build two subsamples results in 531 observations from subjects with a value 18 For all variables that are not denoted on the X-axis of the corresponding panel their mean value is plugged into the estimated probit model. Again, the predictions reported here rely on the full models with all interaction effects. smaller than or equal to four and 534 observations from subjects with a value greater than or equal to five. 19 For the reportedly more risk-averse subjects, we estimate a highly significant preference for right-skewness. For the less risk-averse subjects, a significant preference for left-skewness is observed. Table 4 : Shown are the estimates of the preference parameter via maximum likelihood estimation. Standard errors are corrected for the fact that the same individual is responsible for more than one observation and therefore the errors of the responses from one subject are correlated (see, e. g., Wooldridge 2006) . N denotes the number of observations.
III. Experiment II
One possible explanation for our findings could be that some presentation formats lead to systematically biased variance estimates. For example, the preference for left-skewness under PDFs may be due to the fact that subjects systematically underestimate the variance of the left-skewed distribution. Weber et al. (2005) show that bar charts and probability density functions lead to different variance estimates of historical returns. We conduct a second experiment to investigate this possibility.
III.A. Design
We used the same distributions and presentation formats as in the first two sessions in experiment I, i.e., we only considered one variance condition. Instead of eliciting choice, we asked respondents to compare the distribution in terms of variance. Subjects answered on a five point ordinal scale ('A has a much higher variance than B', 'A has a slightly higher variance than B', 'A has the same variance as B', 'B has a slightly higher variance than A' and 'B has a much higher variance than A').
19 Observations are again pooled over the six presentation formats and over sessions 1-3.
The correct answer to this question is the middle category as all distributions have the same variance per construction.
The experimental procedure was similar to the procedure used in the first experiment. We again used the same three investment scenarios (Index vs. right-skewed, left-skewed vs. Index, rightskewed vs. left-skewed) and six different presentation formats. As in Sessions 1 and 2 in the first experiment, this experiment consisted of two waves. We used the presentation formats RBC, PDF and RCDF in the first wave and the presentation formats CDF, 10S and QTS in the second wave. The time lag between the two waves was twelve days. The number of observations for all presentation formats is given in Table 5 . Subjects were again master students in a behavioral finance class at the University of Münster, but differed from the subject pool used in the first study. No financial incentives were provided. A value of one corresponds to the statement that the more right-skewed distribution is judged to have a much higher variance, while the opposite statement applies for a value of five. A value of three corresponds to an equal variance assessment. Figure 4a shows the results for every presentation format, while Figure 4b additionally disaggregates for all three possible comparisons. We also reproduce the estimated preference parameter from experiment I in parentheses for every presentation format. The variance assessments in Figure 4a are significantly different from three (p<0.001) using a Wilcoxon test for five out of six presentation formats. The only exception is the rotated cumulative distribution function (RCDF), where the small difference from three is not significant (p=0.512).
What is important for the question at hand is the fact that the systematic underestimation of variance of the more right-skewed distributions does not interact with the presentation format.
Interestingly, under probability density functions -the presentation format that leads to a strong preference for left-skewness -the difference from the true answer three and the average assessment of the subjects is greatest. We conclude that it is unlikely that a different perception of variance under different presentation formats is the causal driver of the results.
IV. Experiment III
In our third experiment, we further investigate the preference for left-skewness under probability density functions. This result is probably the most surprising one because rational and behavioral theories predict a preference for right-skewness under standard assumptions. Experiment II shows that a systematic misperception of the variance is not the reason for this outcome. Instead, experiment II deepens the puzzle as respondents judged the variance of the index and left-skewed distributions to be higher compared to the alternative with right skew. A misperception of the expected returns is an obvious second candidate to explain the puzzle. Under the probability density function presentation format, the (return associated with the) peak of the distribution is below the expected value for the right-skewed and the index distributions. The opposite is true for the left-skewed distribution. A plausible heuristic for the estimation procedure of the expected return is anchoring and adjustment (Tversky and Kahnemann 1974) . Subjects may anchor on the peak of the distribution. As they are master students in finance, they should recognize that there is a difference between the peak and the expected value, but if they use the peak as an easy first anchor and then adjust insufficiently, we should expect an overestimation of the expected value for the left-skewed distribution and an underestimation for the two remaining distributions.
Experiment III sheds some light on the extent to which this conjecture is true.
IV.A. Design
We asked finance master students to give a point estimate for the expected value of all three distributions. All distributions were presented as probability distribution functions. The questionnaire was distributed with the second wave of experiment II. No financial incentives were provided.
IV.B. Results Figure 5 reports the results. The expected return of the left-skewed distribution is overestimated (13.6% versus a true value of 10.9%), while the expected return of the index and the right-skewed distributions are underestimated (7.6% versus 10.5% and 5.7% versus 8.6%). The result is consistent with an anchoring and adjustment heuristic where the peak of the probability density function serves as an anchor.
The question remains as to what extent this systematic misperception of returns contributes to the revealed preference for left-skewness. It is of course possible that the misperception explains the surprising revealed preferences entirely. To investigate this question, we repeated the maximum likelihood estimation of a utility function , 3 = + 3 similar to the ones that are reported in Table 3 . However, instead of using the true expected returns as in Table 3 , we use the average estimates reported in Figure 5 . 20 In this analysis we only used the data from lotteries in session 3 that feature a variance of 0.2233. (N=161).
Figure 5: The figure shows the estimated and the true expected value of the left-skewed, the index investment, and the right-skewed distribution, respectively. The underestimation of the expected value for the index and the right skewed distribution is highly significant (p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test), while the Wilcoxon test-statistic for the overestimation in the case of a left-skewed distribution is 2.087 (p=0.037).
The estimated value increases from -0.121 (see Table 3 ) to -0.075. This value is still significantly different from zero (p=0.016, 95% confidence interval: [-0.135; -0.014]). The misperception of expected returns can therefore only partially explain the revealed preferences for left-skewed distributions if probability density functions are used. The coefficient estimate of -0.075 in this subsection is not corrected for the fact that participants perceive the variance of the distributions with negligible and left skew to be higher. Taking this result of experiment II into account would again strengthen the preference for left-skewness. Therefore, the revealed preference for negative skew when return distributions are presented as probability density functions remains a puzzle.
V. Experiment IV
The experiments so far have shown that probability density functions can lead to a significant preference for left-skewness and that this phenomenon can only partly be explained by a 20 Unfortunately, the subject pools for experiments I and III are not identical. Otherwise, it would have been possible to combine the personal estimates with the choices. The general procedure used in this study was similar but not equal to the other studies. The wording of the cover page was slightly different, no explanatory sentence accompanied the PDFs and there were no additional questions at the end of the questionnaire. PDFs were the only presentation format used and subjects had to make only a single investment decision: Index vs.
stochastically dominated left-skewed. The PDF of the index served as investment A in all 21 The term "peak evaluation heuristic" was coined by Summers and Duxbury (2006). questionnaires. 76 of the 136 subjects chose between investment A and investment B, and the other 60 chose between investment A and investment B'.
V.B. Results Table 6 reports on the results. 35.5% of subjects still opt for the left-skewed distribution when it is dominated by the index investment, an observation that strongly supports the peak evaluation heuristic. Higher violation rates of stochastic dominance have only been documented by Birnbaum and Navarette (1998) for choices among tweaked three-outcome lotteries. When the strength of the dominance relationship is increased slightly (Index vs. Investment B'), violation rates drop sharply to 11.7%. This reasonable reaction can also be seen as evidence against a complete misunderstanding of probability density functions by subjects. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze preferences for skewed distributions and show that revealed preferences depend heavily on the format used to communicate asset risk and that self-reported risk aversion is a good predictor of this preference.
The association between preferences and presentation format may be driven by the fact that different presentation formats highlight specific features of a distribution. Ibrekk and Morgan (1987) and Summers and Duxbury (2006) conjecture that people focus on the peak of a distribution when asset risk is communicated via a probability density function. Decreasing (right-)skewness usually means increasing the (return associated with the) peak of the distribution and thereby causing the preference for left-skewed gambles. On the other hand, a cumulative distribution function may aggravate the sometimes insufficient attention people give to probabilities by drawing greater attention to the range of outcomes. 22 The identification of the zero return point on the x-axis might be the easiest cognitive task and therefore the probability of a loss may leap out at subjects' eyes. Further research is needed to clarify the causes of different preferences or risk perceptions with respect to the same random variable under different presentation formats.
Our results should also be seen in the broader perspective of the literature on preference reversals and procedure invariance. Two equivalent methods of elicitation -the use of probability and cumulative density functions -should result in the same preference order from a normative point of view. However, the two elicitation methods yield very different preference patterns. Indeed, there exists a large literature on preference reversals and many types of violations of procedure invariance are documented. 23 However, the violation we discuss is different in flavor from the many reversals that build on differences between choice and pricing tasks or on the framing of gains and losses and changing risk attitude as in the Asian disease problem. 24 Thus, our research provides an opportunity to gain further insights into the processes by which preferences are constructed and preference reversals can occur.
The findings of this paper have several practical implications. First, in advertising their products a financial services firm may choose the presentation format that is most likely to induce specific preferences for the considered financial product. For example, the sales brochure of a mutual fund investing exclusively in growth firms may use a presentation format that induces a preference for right-skewness. Similarly, a firm advertising a discount certificate, a financial instrument that implements a covered call strategy and thereby generates a left-skewed distribution, may use a density function to communicate the asset's risk.
The paper's results are also valuable for financial advisors who are interested in a first glimpse of client-specific skewness preferences. Our results show that self-reported risk aversion, a measure that is already widely used in practice and has been shown to be a precise predictor of risk behavior in a field experiment with a representative sample of the German population (Dohmen et al. 2008) , is also a valuable proxy for skewness preference under most presentations formats. This suggests 22 If people are more used to working with non-cumulative probabilities, a cumulative representation can possibly divert their attention. 23 See Tversky and Thaler (1990) and Seidl (2002) for literature reviews. 24 See Kühberger (1998) for a review of this and other types of framing effects. that many financial advisors may not necessarily need further tools to evaluate the skewness preferences of a client, as a quick and easy-to-use indicator is already available.
From a prescriptive point of view, the use of several presentation formats for the same random variable seems advisable, as different presentation formats may help the decision maker resolve inconsistencies and thus lead to better decisions. The conceptual problem remains that it is difficult to be sure what the "true" preference of a financial decision maker is if his revealed preferences are sensitive to the presentation format. For example, Goldstein et al. (2008) recently proposed an innovative form of preference elicitation, the so-called distribution builder, which has several advantages over traditional preference elicitation methods. But this does not address whether decision makers would build a different distribution under a different presentation format, whether the latter distribution comes closer to the true preference or whether something like a true preference exists at all.
In the apparent tradeoff between realism and experimental control we chose to focus on the influence of presentation format in a context of realistic distributions and not on an analysis of the isolated influence of skewness on preferences. Future research could employ a more tightly controlled experimental environment to identify the drivers of the documented preference reversal and learn something general about people's preference for skewness. In such a more clinical setting with constant information content across all presentation formats, ceteris-paribus variations of the different distributional characteristics could be analyzed to isolate the impact of skewness.
Sophisticated methods as e.g. proposed by Shaw and Buckley (2007) allow to generate distributions for such an analysis. 25 Ideally these distributions of different skew remain unimodal as nicely shaped curves promote the subject's interpretability of their graphical representations.
More detailed research is also needed on other aspects that have only explorative character in our work. The intertwined manipulation of the RCDF (switching axes, final wealth instead of %-returns) could and should be disentangled to better understand the impact on preferences. It will also be important to analyze larger sets of distributions with similar characteristics (ideally also from other domains than just finance) to learn more about the subtleties of the observed preference reversals and to better understand why they occur in the first place and how robust they are. Based on such 25 See also Høyland and Wallace (2001) and Høyland et al. (2003) for a sensible discretization of continuous distributions. additional data it might be possible to develop a theoretical framework that can explain what exactly makes people change their preference across presentation formats.
Appendix A
The three different return distributions that subjects were confronted with in our experiment originate from a Black and Scholes (1973) setup. The continuous 1-year returns of the stock index are assumed to be normally distributed with µ=8% p. a. and σ=20% p. a. The riskless asset offers a return of 4% p. a. We used discrete returns, i.e., the 1-year return of an investment is calculated by
, with 0 the price of the asset today and 1 the (stochastic) price of the asset in one year.
Consequently, a nearly symmetric log-normal distribution with µ=10.52% p. a. and σ=22.33% p. a.
serves as the reference investment. The right-and left-skewed return distributions are created by building portfolios out of the stock index, the risk-free asset and 101 plain-vanilla call options that use the stock index as their underlying and are priced using Black-Scholes. The stock index is initialized with 100 points at t=0. The strike prices of those calls needed to manipulate the skewness of the return distribution are uniformly distributed within the range of 50 to 150 points.
To create the right-skewed distribution used in the experiment, one has to invest roughly 21% of funds in the stock index, 72% in the riskless asset and the remainder evenly among the entire set of call options. The intuition for why this portfolio creates heavily right-skewed returns is as follows.
The combined investment in the riskless asset, the stock index and the deep in-the-money portion of calls makes portfolio returns below -15% virtually impossible. The at-the-money and especially the out-of-the-money calls have over-proportionally high payoffs in good states of nature, i.e., when stock index returns are high. When deviations from the mean are raised to the third power, as it is done when computing skewness, the heavy tail of the positive outliers creates rightskewness. The resulting right-skewed distribution can more precisely be described by:
mean=8.59%, std.dev.=22.33%, skewness=4.05 and kurtosis=26.60. One can conclude that, when optioned portfolios are used to create right-skewed return distributions, higher right-skewness comes at the expense of slightly lower expected returns.
26
To generate the left-skewed distribution we built a portfolio consisting of a leveraged index investment (175% index) that obtains the additionally needed funds by borrowing 61% at the riskless rate and short-selling calls with strike prices from 50 to 129 index points. Here, only the call 26 Results of Agarwal et al. (2008) on the implicit prices of higher moments embedded in S&P 100 index options confirm our conjecture.
options in the range from 50 to 100 index points are equally (negatively) weighted and weights decrease linearly (in absolute terms) after this point up to strike price 130. These particular portfolio weights were carefully chosen to create a smooth and visually appealing probability distribution function. The intuition for why this approach induces left-skewness runs in exactly the opposite direction from the above. Leveraging the index investment widens the distribution of outcomes and increases downside risk, which remains uncompensated, because the short-selling of calls drastically reduces the likelihood of extremely high returns. The moments of the left-skewed distribution are: mean=10.86%, std.dev.=22.33%, skewness=-0.34 and kurtosis=2.99. The leftskewness is reflected in an expected return above the reference index investment. Table A1 specifies the exact portfolio weights used to generate the various return distributions.
Calculation of sub-annual return distributions for the quantiles graphic (QTS):
The sub-annual return distributions were generated by scaling down the (normally distributed)
continuous 1-year returns of the stock index defined by µ=8% and σ=20%. Parameter values the i th month are set to: µ i =8%* 12 and σ i =20%* 12 . The return of the riskless asset is adjusted in the same manner to 4%* 12 . These continuous distributions are then used to calculate the (again discrete) return distributions of the index investment, the right-skewed portfolio and the left-skewed portfolio after i months. For all three portfolios the allocations to stock index, risk-free asset and the 101 plain-vanilla call options are identical to the 12-month base case. As a last step, the median and the 5%/95% quantiles of these three investment strategies can directly be inferred. 
Appendix B
The tables below show the results of probit regressions for sessions 1 and 2 and for session 3 of experiment I. The dependent variable is one if a subject expressed her preference for a more rightskewed gamble and zero otherwise. The independent variables are dummy variables for the presentation formats, self-reported risk aversion and additional terms to capture interactions between presentation formats and risk aversion. In the second experiment, we also include standard deviation and its interaction terms as independent variables. Standard errors are again adjusted with respect to the clustered nature of the data.
Sessions 1 + 2
Model Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Appendix C
Explanatory sentences that accompanied the six presentation formats in the investment decision task (translated from German):
(a) Probability density function (PDF)
From the density function of returns you can read off the probability that you observe a realization of the random variable (return) in a specific interval (between the lower limit L and the upper limit U). This probability results directly from the size of the area underneath the density function between L and U.
(b) Cumulative distribution function (CDF)
From the cumulative distribution function of returns you can read off the probability that you observe a realization of the random variable (return) below a given value X.
(c) Rotated cumulative distribution function (RCDF)
This graph shows the probability that a specific final wealth is exceeded by the investment (A or B).
(d) Randomized bar chart (RBC)
This graph shows 10 observed returns of the two investments (A and B).
(e) 10-state-chart (10S)
This graph shows the returns of the two investments (A and B) in 10 different states. These 10 states all have equal probability (=10%) and are sorted from state 1 to state 10 by ascending returns.
(f) Quantiles graphic (QTS)
This graph shows the development of the 5%-quantile, the 50%-quantile (median) and the 95%-quantile of the two investments (A and B) over the 12-month investment horizon. The value of a X%-quantile specifies the return that is not exceeded in X% of all cases.
